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Abstract
Recently, interpretable models called self-
explaining models (SEMs) have been proposed
with the goal of providing interpretability robust-
ness. We evaluate the interpretability robustness
of SEMs and show that explanations provided
by SEMs as currently proposed are not robust to
adversarial inputs. Specifically, we successfully
created adversarial inputs that do not change the
model outputs but cause significant changes in
the explanations. We find that even though cur-
rent SEMs use stable co-efficients for mapping
explanations to output labels, they do not consider
the robustness of the first stage of the model that
creates interpretable basis concepts from the in-
put, leading to non-robust explanations. Our work
makes a case for future work to start examining
how to generate interpretable basis concepts in a
robust way.
1. Introduction
Interpretability can help increase the adoption of ML in
security- and safety-sensitive situations like the medical
or legal domains. Motivated by this, recent work (Binder
et al., 2016; Sundararajan et al., 2017; Simonyan et al.,
2014; Ribeiro et al., 2016) has focused on explaining model
predictions from already-trained networks. These meth-
ods are considered to be post hoc because they attempt
to explain the output of already-trained networks. How-
ever, Ghorbani et al. (2019) and Alvarez-Melis & Jaakkola
(2018) recently showed that post hoc methods are fragile,
where small changes in the input cause significant changes
in the interpretations without changing the model output.
This fragility is undesirable from a safety and security per-
spective. Part of this fragility could be attributed to: (1)
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the black-box nature of the underlying models that post
hoc methods are trying to explain, and (2) the explanations
themselves are models that can be fragile(Rudin, 2019).
Interpretable models are a kind of non-post hoc interpretabil-
ity method which can naturally explain its own reasoning
for each prediction (Li et al., 2018; Chen et al., 2018).
Melis & Jaakkola (2018) recently proposed interpretable
models called self-explaining models (SEMs) that are de-
signed to provide robust interpretability. SEMs use their
explanations to produce model output (i.e., the models are
transparent in their reasoning process). They take the form
f(x) = θ(x)Th(x), where θ(x) represents interpretable co-
efficients, and h(x) represents interpretable basis concepts—
higher-order features that humans can interpret (e.g., strokes,
shapes, and colors). Melis & Jaakkola (2018) aim to get
robust interpretability in SEMs. They describe Lipschitz
continuity requirements on the design of θ(x) to ensure that
a model’s output is interpretable and stable against input per-
turbations. In this work, we ask: Are these self-explaining
models inherently robust from an interpretability perspec-
tive?
A contribution of this paper is to show that these newly
proposed SEMs still lack sufficient interpretability robust-
ness. In particular, we find that it is possible to generate
small input perturbations that do not change the model out-
put, but result in drastically different interpretable basis
concepts. For both SEM networks (self-explaining neural
nets (Melis & Jaakkola, 2018) and PrototypeDL (Li et al.,
2018)) that have been recently proposed, we demonstrate
that it is possible to craft input perturbations that compro-
mise the interpretability-robustness of SEMs—we generate
adversarial inputs that keep the model output the same, but
create very different explanations for humans. Our results
suggest this is occurring because these models do not im-
pose robustness requirements on h(x), the function that
maps the input to interpretable basis concepts and is the first
stage of the model. An adversarial attack can take advantage
of this.
Based on these results, we conclude that current SEMs
lack a crucial robustness component—robustness of h(x) to
input perturbations. Therefore, this work makes a case for
future exploration of techniques to increase the robustness
of functions that generate interpretable basis concepts for
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self-explaining models.
2. Background
Interpretability-Robustness. We use the following infor-
mal definition for interpretability robustness: a model is not
robust from an interpretability perspective if small changes
in the input cause significant changes in the explanations
generated, but do not cause a change in the model output.
More formally, For a target model f and a natural input-
output pair (x, y), given a budget , an adversarial example
against interpretability x∗ = x+ ∆x satisfies ||∆x||p ≤ 
such that the perturbation is subtle enough so as to not
change the prediction of model (f(x∗) = f(x)), but the
output explanation fexpl(x∗) differs from fexpl(x). In our
experiments, we will be looking for small perturbations that
cause a clearly significant change in the output explanation.
Self-Explaining Models (SEMs) are proposed in (Melis &
Jaakkola, 2018) and take the form:
f(x) = g(θ1(x)h1(x), ..., θk(x)hk(x))
where: (1) k is small. (2) g is monotone and completely ad-
ditive separable, and for every zi := θi(x)hi(x), g satisfies
∂g
∂zi
≥ 0 (g is usually selected as a sum function). (3) hi(x)
and θi(x) are interpretable basis concepts extracted from im-
ages and their influence scores respectively. (4) θ is locally
difference bounded by h: ∀x0,∃δ > 0 and L ∈ R such that
||x−x0|| < δ implies ||θ(x)−θ(x0)|| ≤ L||h(x)−h(x0)||.
The explanation of f(x) is a combination of basis concepts
hi(x) and their influence scores θi(x) for i = 1..k. Property
(4) ensures that, for close inputs x and x0, θ(x) and θ(x0)
should not differ significantly, implying that the explanation
does not change significantly. The interpretability robust-
ness for SEM is evaluated at every point x of interest by
using a Local-Lipschitz value:
Lˆ(x) = max
x∗∈B(x)
||θ(x∗)− θ(x)||2
||h(x∗)− h(x)||2
where B(x) is the allowable space of adversarial perturba-
tions.
Below, we describe two examples of SEMs. Both satisfy
the above properties of SEMs:
Self-Explaining Neural Nets (SENNs). Melis & Jaakkola
(2018) discuss a concrete case of the SEM introduced above,
where h(x) and θ(x) are deep neural nets with convolutional
layers and h(x) can be interpreted as a subset of training
examples. The output of the network is a linear combination
of θ(x) and h(x). The stability of θ(x) is guaranteed by a
training loss regularizer.
PrototypeDL. Li et al. (2018) introduce an interpretable
network based on prototype distances. Like SENN, Proto-
typeDL satisfies the properties of SEMs, but differs in its
design. Unlike SENN, for the interpretable basis concepts,
SENN uses proximity to a prototypical observation in the
training set. The prototypes (encoded in a latent-space) of
PrototypeDL are learned during training, and each prototype
is related to a class and can be visualized as a corresponding
interpretable image (note that one class may have multiple
prototypes). During test-time, PrototypeDL converts inputs
into the same latent-space, and then, for h(x), computes a
distance metric to encoded prototypes. PrototypeDL then
uses a fully-connected layer to produce the classification
using a θ(x) that is learned during training but, unlike in
SENN, is a constant vector. Because θ(x) is a constant vec-
tor, PrototypeDL mathematically meets the Local-Lipschitz
constraint of SEM; it has a Local-Lipschitz value of zero
for every point of interest.
3. Attack Approach: Generating Adversarial
Examples
3.1. Targeted Attack against SENN
As shown in Fig.1, we observe that the natural images of 9
and 2 have significantly different values of h(x). The goal
of our attack is to influence the explanation by making both
images (9 and 2) have a similar h(x) values (interpretable
basis concepts) with a small perturbation on 9.
Figure 1. The case study of the attack against SENN. 1st column:
input images with a natural 9, adversarial 9, and natural 2 (tar-
get). 2nd column: Interpretable basis concepts. 3rd column:
Co-efficients applied to basis concepts. 4th column onwards: a
visualization of the basis concepts.
We construct it as a targeted attack problem: for a natural
image x with label y and a natural target image xt hav-
ing a different label, we can generate an adversarial image
x∗ ∈ B(x) to make h(x∗) close to h(xt). To encourage
the perturbation not to change the predicted label, we use
classification loss Ly(f(x∗), y) as a regularizer.
arg min
x∗∈B(x)
||h(x∗)− h(xt)||2 + λLy(f(x∗), y) (1)
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Prototype Nat. Adv. Nat. Adv. Nat. Adv. Nat. Adv. Nat. Adv.
0.23 1.29 1.46 1.02 1.41 1.27 2.78 1.44 1.08 1.43
1.48 1.25 1.78 1.07 0.85 0.95 1.79 0.75 1.99 2.19
0.34 1.12 1.0 0.58 1.1 1.08 2.05 1.06 0.92 1.29
1.84 1.18 1.76 0.9 1.0 0.86 1.28 1.03 2.56 2.45
1.15 1.44 0.28 0.73 1.06 1.12 0.96 1.21 0.78 1.34
1.28 1.63 1.46 1.18 0.47 0.91 1.66 1.22 1.85 2.81
1.35 1.43 1.31 1.01 1.61 1.71 1.68 0.83 0.35 1.07
2.14 1.2 0.91 0.74 1.01 1.01 0.14 0.78 1.52 1.84
2.34 1.47 2.52 1.28 1.31 1.03 1.7 1.28 2.95 2.71
2.21 1.19 3.17 1.2 2.28 1.85 2.1 0.76 1.44 1.37
1.69 1.36 1.91 1.23 1.86 1.79 1.88 0.65 0.45 0.95
1.7 1.28 1.61 0.86 1.38 1.08 1.47 1.15 0.75 1.23
1.6 1.0 2.05 0.7 2.09 1.77 1.7 0.62 1.18 1.06
1.1 0.94 1.56 0.76 0.76 0.76 1.54 0.51 1.41 1.6
1.49 1.08 1.39 0.67 1.12 0.99 1.04 0.74 0.53 1.07
Table 1. Case study of the adversarial attack against the interpretability of PrototypeDL. The first column shows the visualization images
of the prototypes of the model, and other columns show the input images and their prototype distance h(x). The bold values are the
distances to the prototype of the correct label and the red values are the smallest prototype distance in a column.
3.2. Untargeted Attack against PrototypeDL
As shown in Table 1, when we feed a natural image to the
PrototypeDL, there is consistency between the prototype
distances and the label—the prototypes of correct label y
always have the smallest distance (red bold value in the
natural image column) to the true interpretation.
The goal of our attack is to cause an inconsistency between
classification and interpretation. Although θ is a constant
vector in PrototypeDL, the inconsistency can be achieved
by causing h(x∗) to differ from h(x).
The perturbation should (1) increase the prototype distances
to the correct label and (2) reduce the prototype distances
to the wrong labels. Let Y (j) be the label of the j-th proto-
type. Since different labels may have a different number of
prototypes, we calculate the average l2-norm distance from
prototypes of y as the overall distance D(x, y) of x to label
y:
D(x, y) =
√ ∑
Y (j)=y h
2
j (x)∑
j I(Y (j) = y)
(2)
Similarly, we defineR(x, y) as the average l2-norm distance
of x from prototypes of labels not including y:
R(x, y) =
√ ∑
Y (j)6=y h
2
j (x)∑
j I(Y (j) 6= y)
We can combine them to obtain the interpretability loss that
measures the inconsistency between the interpretation and
classification result:
Lh(x, y) = D(x, y)− λR(x, y)
Furthermore, we require that the perturbation does not
change the prediction label. Therefore, we aim to find a per-
turbation that considers the classification loss Ly(f(x∗), y)
as a penalty:
arg max
x∗∈B(x)
Lh(x
∗, y)− ξLy(f(x∗), y)− α||h(x∗)||2 (3)
The last term is a regularizer that penalizes large hi(x∗).
Empirically, we found it to be useful in generating better
adversarial samples that pass manual scrutiny.
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4. Experiments
4.1. SENN
We use the author-provided implementation of SENN to
train a model with 12 interpretable basis concepts (Melis &
Jaakkola, 2018). We perform the PGD attack (Madry et al.,
2018) with L∞( = 0.3) to solve objective function (1) of
Section 3.1 to generate the adversarial examples.
From Fig.1, we observe that the interpretable basis con-
cepts for natural and adversarial h(9) are very different.
Specifically, adversarial h(9) is closer to h(2). A human
interpreting these two examples would be confused because,
although the inputs look visually close to each other, the
network explanation of the adversarial digit 9 is pretty close
to the explanation for the digit 2. This can be problematic
when this type of network is used for more complex tasks
such as cancer detection, where the correct interpretation
is not obvious. We note that the co-efficients θ(x) are gen-
erally unaffected by the perturbation to h(x). Our initial
expectation was that because the adversarial input image has
features similar to the target, θ(x) should, in theory, respond
as if the target itself (the digit 2) was being presented as
input. However, we did not observe it in practice, and this
warrants further exploration.
We also investigate the performance of the above attack
on the whole test dataset. Fig.2 shows the distribution of
three different l2-norm h(x) distances:1 (1) Adversarial
out-class distance: For each x in test dataset, we calculate
minxt,x∗ ||h(x∗)− h(xt)||2 subject to xt having a different
label than x, x∗ ∈ B(x), and x∗ having the same predicted
label as x. (2) In-class distance: For each x in test dataset,
we calculate minxt ||h(x) − h(xt)||2 subject to xt having
the same label as x. (3) Out-class distance: For each x in
test dataset, we calculate minxt ||h(x)− h(xt)||2 subject to
xt having a different label than x.
As shown in Fig.2, we observe that in-class distance is
significantly smaller than out-class distance, since the im-
ages in the same class should have more similar features.
We also observe that adversarial out-class distance is even
smaller than the natural in-class distance, implying that ad-
versarial perturbations are often successful in changing the
interpretable basis concepts of an input to that of an input in
a different class.
4.2. PrototypeDL
We train PrototypeDL using the author-provided implemen-
tation2 with 15 prototypes (Li et al., 2018). To evaluate the
1for (1) We choose 100 random xt from the test dataset. For
(2) and (3), we exhaust all pairs in test dataset to get the minimum
value.
2https://github.com/OscarcarLi/PrototypeDL
Figure 2. Comparison on the distribution of different distances.
The first one shows the distribution of the adversarial out-class
distance. The second and third box show the (natural) in-class
distance and out-class distance, respectively.
effectiveness of the attack, we perform the PGD attack with
L∞( = 0.3) to solve objective function (3) of Section 3.2.
Figure 3. Comparison on overall distances. The first one shows
the overall distance of the correct label D(x, y), and the sec-
ond one shows the minimum overall distance to any other labels
miny 6=y0 D(x, y) in the natural dataset. The last two show the
same kind of overall distances, D(x∗, y) and miny 6=y0 D(x
∗, y),
in the adversarial dataset.
From Table 1, we observe that the interpretable basis con-
cepts h(x) of natural images are consistent with the rele-
vant prototypes – the smallest distance points to the correct
prototype (bold red values). However, for adversarial exam-
ples, the smallest values in the columns point to incorrect
prototypes. For example, in the adversarial 2 column, the
prototype which has the smallest distance(0.94) corresponds
to digit 0. Thus, the network is saying that it thinks the digit
2 looks like the digit 0, and therefore, it has produced the
label 2. This is clearly confusing.
We evaluate the attack effectiveness by calculating distances
using D(x, y) (equation (2) of Section 3.2). Fig.3 shows
that nearly all images in clean test dataset have smaller
distances to correctly labeled prototypes. But, in contrast,
the distances for samples from the adversarial dataset do
not have such a property; we observe that D(x∗, y) and
minyi 6=yD(x
∗, yi) have the almost same distribution, sug-
gesting that PrototypeDL cannot extract robust interpretable
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basis features h(x) that explain adversarial examples.
5. Discussion and Conclusion
We investigate the robustness self-explaining models and
find that they are not robust to input perturbations that cause
changes in the interpretations without changing the model
output. We design and evaluate adaptive attacks that cause
changes in how interpretable basis concepts are extracted
from the input. Based on this work, we make a case for
exploring how self-explaining models can be made robust
by increasing the stability and robustness of the first stage
of the classification pipeline that extracts interpretable basis
concepts. We anticipate two directions for future work to
achieve robust interpretable basis concepts: (1) use adversar-
ial training framework of Madry et al. (Madry et al., 2018)
with our adaptive attacks for first stage of the pipeline and
(2) consider adding a local-Lipschitz stability property for
h(x) with respect to x in the SEM framework of Alvarez-
Melis and Jaakkola (Melis & Jaakkola, 2018).
Acknowledgements
We are thankful to Kevin Eykholt for input and advice
throughout the project and David Alvarez Melis for sharing
their code with us. This work was supported by Didi Chux-
ing AI Lab. This work was also supported in part by NSF
Grant No. 1646392.
References
Alvarez-Melis, D. and Jaakkola, T. S. On the robustness of
interpretability methods. In Workshop on Human Inter-
pretability in Machine Learning (@ICML), 2018.
Binder, A., Montavon, G., Lapuschkin, S., Mu¨ller, K.-R.,
and Samek, W. Layer-wise relevance propagation for
neural networks with local renormalization layers. In
International Conference on Artificial Neural Networks,
pp. 63–71. Springer, 2016.
Chen, C., Li, O., Barnett, A., Su, J., and Rudin, C. This
looks like that: deep learning for interpretable image
recognition. arXiv preprint arXiv:1806.10574, 2018.
Ghorbani, A., Abid, A., and Zou, J. Interpretation of neural
networks is fragile. In Thirty-Second AAAI Conference
on Artificial Intelligence, 2019.
Li, O., Liu, H., Chen, C., and Rudin, C. Deep learning
for case-based reasoning through prototypes: A neural
network that explains its predictions. In Thirty-Second
AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018.
Madry, A., Makelov, A., Schmidt, L., Tsipras, D., and
Vladu, A. Towards deep learning models resistant to
adversarial attacks. In Sixth International Conference on
Learning Representations, 2018.
Melis, D. A. and Jaakkola, T. Towards robust interpretability
with self-explaining neural networks. In NeurIPS’18:
Neural Information Processing Systems., pp. 7775–7784,
2018.
Ribeiro, M. T., Singh, S., and Guestrin, C. Why should i
trust you?: Explaining the predictions of any classifier.
In Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGKDD international
conference on knowledge discovery and data mining, pp.
1135–1144. ACM, 2016.
Rudin, C. Stop explaining black box machine learning
models for high stakes decisions and use interpretable
models instead. Nature Machine Intelligence, 1(5):206,
2019.
Simonyan, K., Vedaldi, A., and Zisserman, A. Deep inside
convolutional networks: Visualising image classification
models and saliency maps. In International Conference
on Learning Representations, 2014.
Sundararajan, M., Taly, A., and Yan, Q. Axiomatic attri-
bution for deep networks. In Proceedings of the 34th
International Conference on Machine Learning-Volume
70, pp. 3319–3328. JMLR. org, 2017.
